1	1	FATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
2	DIS	TRICT OF DELAWARE	
3	IN RE:	. Chapter 11	
4	URSA OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, et al.,	. Case No. 20-12067(BLS)	
5	1110, 66 41.,	•	
6	Debtors.	· ·	
7	THE ROYALTY CLAIMANTS,		
8	Appellants,	•	
10	v.	•	
11	URSA OPERATING COMPANY LI		
12	Appellee.	Wilmington, Delaware 19801April 16, 2024 10:37 a.m.	
13	TRANSCI	RIPT OF ZOOM HEARING	
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRENDAN L. SHANNON UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE		
15 16	APPEARANCES:		
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21	Electronically Recorded By:	ECRO	
22	Transcription Service:	Reliable 1007 N. Orange Street	
23		Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Telephone: (302) 654-8080	
24 25	Proceedings recorded by transcript produced by to	E-Mail: gmatthews@reliable-co.com electronic sound recording: ranscription service.	

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(Proceedings commenced at 10:37 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, all. This is Judge

Shannon. I understand from the court reporter that necessary parties have joined.

This is a hearing in the matter of Ursa Operating Company, which is Case Number 20-12067. This is a status conference that the Court has scheduled in connection with the Third Circuit's opinion reversing the opinion of the District Court and this Court, and sending then the mandate back down to this Court for further proceedings.

It has been a while since I've seen all of these parties. It is good to see you and I hope that you're all well.

The purpose that I have for today is really to look for guidance and input from all of the parties with respect to further steps. I have, obviously, carefully read the Third Circuit's opinion and direction to this Court about further proceedings, and I wish to do so efficiently and promptly now that we do have the mandate that has been issued by the Circuit.

I'm going to hear from everybody today, but I think I'd like to start with hearing from counsel for the debtor, and I would also -- I think I'd like to be guided by whether the parties have had any opportunity to discuss and perhaps map out what our next steps should be in terms of

scheduling and mechanics.

I see Mr. Enos on the line. Good morning and welcome, sir.

Mr. Barton, it's been a while. It's good to see you as well, sir.

MR. BARTON: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning.

THE COURT: All right. Can I hear from Mr. Enos

first, but, as I said, I'll hear from everybody.

MR. ENOS: Thank you very much, Your Honor, and good morning, Ken Enos, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor on behalf of the debtor.

Your Honor, at the outset, yes, we actually did have an opportunity to consult with counsel to the Royal Claimants yesterday and, although we certainly appreciate them taking the time to speak with us, I think it was time worth spent -- excuse me, time well spent -- unfortunately, but I suppose not surprisingly, we don't really see eye-to-eye on where we should go from here.

Our view is -- and if you look back -- and,
believe me, this is not from my recollection, I had to read
the transcript -- if you look back at the transcript when
this issue was argued before the Court, we teed it up in a
way that there was three gating issues presented to you, and
you ruled in the debtors' favor with respect to one of those
issues. And, you know, reading between the lines, I'm

assuming you did not reach the other two issues because you didn't feel you needed to.

The Third Circuit -- it went up on appeal before the Third Circuit, the Third Circuit obviously reversed and ruled in favor of the Royalty Claimants with respect to the first issue, and that being that, under Colorado law, Royalty Claimants do have a real property interest in the unpaid royalties and that Colorado's constructive trust doctrine supports the imposition of a constructive trust. And I'm probably paraphrasing a bit there, but I believe that was the gist of the ruling.

So that kind of leaves the two other issues that we believe were argued before the Court ripe for consideration, that being the effect of this Court's final DIP order on the Royalty Claimants' property of (indiscernible) argument; and then the second issue being that whether the Royalty Claimants are able to identify and trace the proceeds that they claim are in fact their property.

Now, it's our view -- and I recognize that counsel to the Royalty Claimants don't feel this way and, if I was in their shoes, I probably would not either, but it's our view that these two other gating issues should be addressed before we do anything further, and I say that for a few reasons.

First off, as I pointed out, the issues were

already fully briefed, we believe the record is closed and, subject to anything that the Court may want from the parties, which we would be happy to provide, we don't think anything further is really necessary for the Court to get up to speed and rule on the issue.

The second point being is that the Court pointed out at the hearing back in March -- and, again, this is from reviewing the transcript -- as you pointed out, that hearing was to kind of sort through some of the gated items to avoid going into the weeds.

This is a liquidating estate with limited resources. So I would suggest that we only go into the weeds if the other issues are not found to be in our favor. They have to be addressed anyway, so we view that it's important, and it's most productive and efficient, to take those two issues first before proceeding to kind of larger trial preparations and the discovery and expense that would be associated with those issues.

So, Your Honor, I think that is kind of the broad view of where we think things stand and how we think the Court should move forward. I'm happy to answer any questions the Court may have, and then I don't know if Mr. Velevis or Ms. Alfonso believe I missed anything or have anything to add, but I believe that's the debtors' perspective on where we should be heading.

THE COURT: No, I appreciate that. I don't have any questions and I'd like to hear from either Mr. Velevis or Ms. Alfonso, or anyone else on the debtors' side of this equation, so that Mr. Barton has an opportunity to respond to all of the comments and points that are being made. So I'm happy to hear from counsel.

Mr. Velevis, I see you've turned your mike on. Good morning, good to see you.

MR. VELEVIS: Good to see you too, Your Honor. I turned my mike on only so that I could say I think that Mr. Enos covered it from the debtors' perspective. Ms. Alfonso may have additional input from the DIP lender's perspective.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Alfonso, did you wish to be heard?

MS. ALFONSO: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. For the record, Ana Alfonso, Willkie, Farr & Gallagher, counsel for Wells Fargo, which was the administrative agent and a lender under the DIP facility and the prepetition RBL facility.

Your Honor, if I could go back in time, I might have asked the Court to make a specific ruling protecting the integrity of the DIP order. We did file papers in sort of a me-too fashion many years ago, but we did not ask for a ruling on that point, perhaps because I took it for granted that I was so sure I was right about it that we wouldn't have to go there and that maybe it would be easier for the parties

for Your Honor to focus on the ruling that Your Honor did 1 focus on. 2 3 That being said, we're now here, many years later, 4 and I'm still looking at the same DIP order that I believe is 5 crystal clear that this whole dispute is exactly the type of 6 thing that the admissions and the releases and the challenge period deadline in the DIP order were designed to protect. 7 We haven't been driving the bus of this dispute, but the 9 lenders are paying for the gas and we're almost out of gas. 10 So what I would ask, respectfully, Your Honor, is that if we could, before any ink gets spilt on discovery or 11 12 anything of that nature, that we have one more opportunity to 13 explain our position and walk the parties through the DIP order and why we think that this dispute is time-barred. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Alfonso. Mr. Barton, good afternoon again, welcome. It's 16 17 good to see you -- or good morning, I guess. I'd like your 18 thoughts. 19 MR. BARTON: Your Honor, I'm going to have Ms. Sawczuk initially address --20 21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. BARTON: -- these issues. Thank you. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, Ms. Sawczuk. 24 Good to see you, as always.

MS. SAWCZUK: Good morning, Your Honor, Maria

25

Sawczuk on behalf of the Royalty Claimants, and here we are.

Your Honor, I was actually a little shocked yesterday when we had our conversations that we weren't seeing eye-to-eye -- I shouldn't say shocked because we haven't seen eye-to-eye in this case, but I thought given the Third Circuit's ruling that we would all kind of know where we were going and it would just be a matter of putting a scheduling order together. The Third Circuit plainly sets out what the next steps are. It says the Royalty Claimants are correct that, under Colorado law, they have a real property interest in unpaid royalties, and Colorado's constructive trust doctrine supports a position of a constructive trust if a fact finder concludes that Ursa was unjustly enriched at the Royalty Claimants' expense.

And then, further down, it says the Bankruptcy

Court reserved for a future hearing whether Ursa made any
improper deductions and, if so, the amount of those
deductions as related to each Royalty Claimant. On remand,
additional fact-finding will be necessary to determine which,
if any, Royalty Claimants may be entitled to a constructive
trust remedy.

Your Honor, the court also goes on to say that the -- to the extent that there is a finding that the Royalty Claimants were not paid what they were supposed to be paid and that the -- and that Ursa was unjustly enriched, these

assets, these dollars are not property of the estate and, therefore, can't be -- can't be given as a DIP to the lender.

And, if you recall, Your Honor even said that when we were asking for a stay or for a trust to be put into place for these funds to be protected. We kind of conceded that Wells Fargo isn't going anywhere and that, to the extent that these funds are not property of the estate, they would be returned to the claimants.

So I think at this point we just need to start looking at whether or not the -- that Ursa was unjustly enriched and that's going to involve some discovery. And I know that the debtors don't want to do that, they have resisted for, you know, nearly a decade now giving us any documentation to prove our case, and much of it is in their hands, although there will be some third party discovery because -- and Mr. Barton can go into that, but I believe that there's documents that other parties have that the debtor may not have, but we need to just -- we need to find out what the Royalty Claimants are owed because the determination has been made that these funds, if we are owed any, are not property of the estate and that a constructive trust should be -- you know, should be imposed.

And as to the tracing issue, we don't even know what we're tracing yet because we don't know if there's monies there or not. So we've got to get to -- we've got to

get to the point where we know how much is owed to these claimants and what we're exactly fighting over. And if that involves a limited discovery just for that point, maybe we go there first, but, quite frankly, I think the ball is ready to roll now on each of these adversary actions, and we need to get a scheduling order in place and start discovery.

And I'll give it to Mr. Barton to add anything that I may have missed in that presentation because I know he does have thoughts on this as well.

THE COURT: Sure. Mr. Barton?

MR. BARTON: Thank you. Let me give you sort of a sense, Your Honor, of what the discovery is that we really need. There's an eight-year period of time that's involved here, and a company called Antero Resources sold its oil and gas interest in Garfield County to Ursa back in 2012. And so the period of time for the Royalty Claimants' underpayment claims against Ursa extend through 2012 -- actually, December of 2012 through December of 2020, when Ursa's sale to Terra Energy Partners was accomplished.

And the way I believe Ursa kept track of its royalty accounting was that initially Ursa was doing its own royalty accounting and, you know, paying the royalties out to the Royalty Claimants in this case, as well as the members of the proposed class in the adversary proceedings as well, but there came a point in time prior to Ursa's bankruptcy filing

where Ursa delegated that duty to a third party. And so that third party then has the royalty accounting data from whenever their responsibilities commenced through the date of the bankruptcy and beyond, as far as I know.

In addition to that, what happens in these cases, Your Honor -- and I think it's true today as well -- is that some of the products that come from the Royalty Claimants' wells actually end up being transferred to a third party processing company, in this case I think the processing company was Enterprise, and then Enterprise ends up processing the gas and transporting the valuable natural gas liquid product to a fractionation facility, after which it's fractionated and sold to the third party purchasers of those natural gas liquid products. This information is critically important in connection with determining the amount of the royalty underpayments that are owed to the Royalty Claimants in this case.

So to give you a sense of it, there is going to be some, you know, discovery on royalty accounting and it has to come directly from Ursa, some that has to come from a third party that Ursa hired to do its royalty accounting services, and some from a third party that did the processing and actually sold the natural gas liquid products. That's data that we need to get and, you know, I believe that we need to have a scheduling order in place that allows us to get this

information efficiently. We've done this in scores of other cases, we've actually done it, you know, in the underlying litigation against Antero, which was Ursa's predecessor, but we don't have the data for the eight-year period from December 2012 to December 2020, and that's what we need to get.

And we certainly -- we also need to get data related to the tracing of Ursa's assets. We know -- and, obviously, I have a copy of the sale transaction under which Ursa sold its assets to TEP and was paid \$60 million in exchange for that, but at this point we don't know the details, any of the details with respect to, you know, how that money was later transferred and provided to Wells Fargo and the other secured lenders.

As Your Honor will recall, we did seek a stay of the distribution to Wells Fargo and the other secured lenders back when this case was before Your Honor prior to our appeal to the District Court and to the Third Circuit, but Your Honor denied that request, but you did say, in pertinent part, that if we were successful on appeal, we certainly should have and would have the right to pursue, you know, the secured lenders who hold the money, and maybe nearly all the money, that's at issue with respect to the royalty owners' claim -- Royalty Claimants' claims against Ursa.

And so all of that is the type of discovery that

we need to get, and related to other discovery related to the tracing of the assets.

So, with respect to the DIP claim that was referenced by opposing counsel, you know, the only thing I'm going to say is this, that there was a procedural issue that came up and that Ursa argued in the Third Circuit on its petition for rehearing that the Court should modify its opinion and allow Your Honor in the first instance to, you know, make a ruling on the DIP issue. It didn't say it was a preferred issue or it was a gatekeeping issue, nor did it say that its comments in the original opinion, which I know Your Honor has access to, were in any way wrong or erroneous in which it rejected out of hand the whole DIP argument.

So, you know, our view is that there's no case law anywhere that supports any of their arguments on this DIP claim, and there's no basis whatsoever for that issue to have some sort of priority gatekeeping function in this litigation. I think that's wrong and I'm not aware of any authority that would permit that.

So I think we need to get a scheduling order in this case. We don't have a scheduling order, we never have. There's no discovery that's been conducted in this case, and we need to have the discovery move forward so that we can get the data that we need in able to file dispositive motions with respect to all -- or most -- I shouldn't say all -- most

of the Royalty Claimants' claims.

MR. ENOS: Your Honor, may I respond?

THE COURT: Mr. Enos, sure.

4 | MR. ENOS: Yes, just two points, Your Honor.

First off, on the DIP issue, as Mr. Barton pointed out, I think it is noteworthy that in the -- after we filed the petition for rehearing that language was struck out of the opinion, therefore -- thereby reserving that issue for the Court to interpret its own orders. I think that's important to note.

And I recognize what Mr. Barton said about the Court, you know, had in the original opinion about that DIP order. However, first off, that was not in the final opinion and, second, I think there's a very large difference between the Court dismissing certain arguments made by the appellants in a brief versus the Court considering your interpretation and review and ruling on the impact of that DIP order. So I think those are two very important points.

I'm not going to get into the substance of Mr.

Barton's arguments. Obviously, as a bankruptcy practitioner,
we very much disagree with his interpretation of the
importance of the language in that DIP order, but I'll leave
it at that.

And then the second point, Your Honor, regarding the tracing issue, I will point out -- and Ms. Sawczuk, I'm

sure she -- she is correct, she quoted directly from the beginning of the opinion, but I think she left out and she didn't mention kind of one of the final paragraphs of the opinion where the Third Circuit noted that, although a constructive trust is an available remedy under Colorado law, none of this absolves the Royalty Claimants of their responsibility of identifying the funds that they assert to be equitably theirs. And also following the petition for rehearing the court included a footnote that made it clear that further discovery is up to the discretion of Your Honor.

So I think the Third Circuit's ruling is very much

-- it's a puzzle piece that fits very well with kind of what

we are proposing the Court to do at this time with respect to

kind of handling these issues in a succession, as opposed to

all at once.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Enos.

Ms. Alfonso, did you want the last word?

MS. ALFONSO: One last word, Your Honor. I won't respond to everything point-by-point. We've all argued about this for years, so I think it's pretty what everyone's positions are, but just on the tracing point. Mr. Barton mentioned a need to trace proceeds of collateral to Wells, that's not really the tracing issue here. The question here is tracing the underpayments to the estate; that is the issue

of tracing that has to be established for purposes of confirming the existence of a RES to which a constructive trust can attach and, for all the reasons we've previously stated and would be happy to explain again, there is no such RES.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SAWCZUK: Your Honor, may I just make one comment --

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. SAWCZUK: -- with respect to what Mr. Enos said. The language that he quoted I omitted from the footnote about we express no opinion on whether the Bankruptcy Court must reopen discovery and we'll defer to its sound discretion, that is accurate, that is in the footnote, and I did not quote it because we never had discovery and the Third Circuit doesn't know that. They just know that an adversary action came up to them and one would assume that discovery would have occurred and then matters would have been resolved.

So, you know, we haven't done discovery yet, that's the whole point. We need to now do discovery. We need to get to the point of finding out how much this money is and then tracing it. Yes, we do need to trace it, but we can't do that until we know what we're tracing, and that's

what the discovery is going to do.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right, here's what we're going to do. I certainly understand the bid and the ask between the parties, and I'm not surprised even a little that there's not consensus on what the appropriate path forward is, but it was helpful to me to get reacquainted with all of these issues. I've obviously reviewed the file and the materials, as well as the opinions. I'm going to essentially take this matter under advisement. I expect to send a letter to counsel today — probably not today, probably tomorrow, after I've had an opportunity to get my arms all the way around the competing positions the parties have, and it will identify from my point of view the path forward for this proceeding.

Again, I think I understand with perfect clarity the different opinions -- or the different positions stated by the parties and, obviously, I have my marching orders coming down from the Circuit with respect to further proceedings on remand. So I don't think I have any questions for the parties. I want the opportunity, rather than just off the cuff today, to provide direction. So I want to review the file and I, again, expect to provide the parties with direction by letter by tomorrow.

Are there any questions?

COUNSEL: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, very good. Well, again, it was a pleasure to see everybody back and all well after a few years. And the pandemic is over, so that's good. And I'll be in touch with you and I expect to be in touch with the parties promptly to keep the matter moving forward as directed by the Circuit. Thanks again, Counsel. Have a good day. COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings concluded at 11:00 a.m.)

CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my knowledge and ability. /s/ Tracey J. Williams_____ April 25, 2024 Tracey J. Williams, CET-914 Certified Court Transcriptionist For Reliable